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CIVIL RIGHTS-THE CONSTRUCTIVE DISCHARGE DOCTRINE
AND ITS APPLICABILITY TO SEXUAL HARASSMENT CASES:
DOES IT MATTER WHAT THE EMPLOYER INTENDED
ANYMORE?
Hukkanen v. International Union of Operating Engineers,
3 F.3d 281 (8th Cir. 1993)
I.

FACTS

In 1978, Ms. Nancy J. Hukkanen [hereinafter Hukkanen] began
working for the International Union of Operating Engineers, Hoisting
and Portable Local No. 101 [hereinafter the Union], as a general office
worker and was later promoted to a secretarial position.' In 1980, Mr.
Sam F. Long [hereinafter Long] became the chief executive officer of
the Union 2 and asked Hukkanen to be his personal secretary. 3 In June
of 1981, Long began sexually harassing Hukkanen. 4 On October 29,
1984, Hukkanen resigned from her position with the Union because
Long's repeated harassment created intolerable working conditions. 5
After her resignation, Hukkanen sued Long and the Union alleging
that Long's sexual harassment 6 constituted sex discrimination under
Title V117 and, as a result, Hukkanen had been constructively disi. Hukkanen v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, 3 F.3d 281,284 (8th Cir. 1993).
2. Id. Long and the Union were both defendants in the instant case. Id.
3. Id. During her first two years with the Union, Hukkanen had little contact with Long. Id.
4. Hukkanen, 3 F.3d at 284. The district court found that Long's conduct toward Hukkanen was
unsolicited and offensive and occurred regularly between June of 1981 and August of 1984. Id. at
285. Long's conduct included propositioning Hukkanen to have sex with him, attempting "to engage
her in offensive conversations about sex, touch[ing] her breasts, and paw[ing] between her legs." Id.
On one occasion in his office, Long brandished a gun and threatened to rape Hukkanen. Id.
5. Hukkanen, 3 F.3d at 285. At the time of Hukkanen's resignation, neither the Union nor Long
intended to fire her. Id. In fact, Long even asked Hukkanen if she would reconsider her decision to
resign as his personal secretary. Id. Just over a month after her resignation, on December 1, 1984,
Hukkanen began working for a different employer at a lower wage. Id.
6. Courts have recognized two types of sexual harassment claims under Title VII: quid pro quo
and hostile environment. Jones v. Wesco Inv., Inc., 846 F.2d 1154, 1156 (8th Cir. 1988). Quid pro quo
sexual harassment "occurs when submission to sexual conduct is made a condition of concrete
employment benefits." Id. (citing Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1013 (8th Cir. 1988) (quoting
Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1413 (10th Cir. 1987))). Hostile environment sexual
harassment is defined as "conduct [that] has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an
individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working
environment." Bums v. McGregor Elec. Indus., Inc., 955 F.2d 559, 563-64 (8th Cir. 1992) (citing 29
C.F.R. § 1604.1 l(a)(3) (1988)).
7. Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act is federal statutory law which bars discrimination by
employers against employees because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703, as amended 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1989). The purpose of Title
VII is to end discrimination and allow protected groups to compete for employment on the basis of
their qualifications and not be hindered by their membership in a protected class. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e
to 2000e-17 (1988). Section 703(a)(1) is the applicable statutory provision of Title VII in the instant
case because it explicitly prohibits sex discrimination by employers with respect to conditions of
employment. Id. Section 703(a)(1) provides:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
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charged. 8 The district court found that Long's ongoing sexual harassment of Hukkanen was both offensive and unwelcome. 9 The district
court further found that the cumulative effect of Long's conduct created

intolerable working conditions and that a reasonable person in Hukkanen's position would have felt forced to resign.10 Therefore, the district court concluded that Long's treatment of Hukkanen constituted
sexual harassment," that the harassment created continuing violations of

(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to his [or her] compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(I) (1989) (codifying § 703 of the 1964 Civil Rights Act).
8. Hukkanen, 3 F.3d at 284. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission [hereinafter
EEOC] exists to prevent "any person from engaging in any unlawful employment practice." and
provides specific guidelines for a Title VII plaintiff to follow when making a claim of discrimination.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1989) (codifying § 706). Section 706(e)(1) of the 1964 Civil Rights Act is one
of many provisions provided by the EEOC which sets forth the appropriate statute of limitations period
in a Title VII case. Id. § 2000e-5(e)(l). Section 706(e)(1) provides that "[a] charge under this
section shall be filed within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment
practice occurred." Id.
9. See Hukkanen, 3 F.3d at 284. In sexual harassment cases, courts require plaintiffs to show
that a defendant's sexual advances are unwelcome. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66
(1986). In determining whether conduct by a defendant is unwelcome, the trier of fact must look at
the totality of the circumstances to make that determination. Burns. 955 F.2d at 564. A trier of fact
considers conduct to be unwelcome if the plaintiff considers it to be offensive or undesirable, and if he
or she did not solicit or encourage it. Id. at 565 (citing Hall, 842 F.2d at 1014). In Burns, the Eighth
Circuit determined that when the district court found that the defendant's advances were unwelcome,
the court also necessarily found that defendant's behavior was offensive. Id.
10. Hukkanen, 3 F.3d at 285. The district court applied the standard for constructive discharge
the Eighth Circuit previously set forth in Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co., 646 F.2d 1250, 1256 (8th Cir.
1981). Id. The Bunny Bread standard requires a plaintiff to show that "a reasonable person [in the
employee's situation] would find [working] conditions intolerable" and that the employer's deliberate
actions were taken with the intention of forcing the employee to resign. Id.
11. See discussion supra at note 6 (stating the difference between quid pro quo sexual
harassment and hostile environment sexual harassment).
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Title VII as sex discrimination,1 2 and that Long and the Union
constructively discharged Hukkanen as a result of those violations.13
Accordingly, the district court awarded Hukkanen back pay,' 4 front

12. See supra note 7 (discussing the purpose of Title VII in seeking to end discrimination in
employment and its applicability to individuals who are members of a protected class). Because Title
VII forbids discrimination on the basis of sex, sexual behavior directed at a woman raises the
inference that the harassment is based on her sex, and is therefore considered sex discrimination for
purposes of Title VII. See, e.g., Huddleston v. Roger Dean Chevrolet, Inc., 845 F.2d 900, 905 (11 th
Cir. 1988) (stating that a plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination by showing a
pattern of sexual harassment that subjects the employee to disparate treatment discrimination with
respect to a term, condition, or privilege of employment).
13. Hukkanen, 3 F.3d at 284. In the instant case, the Union and Long contended that Hukkanen's
Title VII claim was time barred because she failed to file a claim with the EEOC within the one
hundred and eighty day period. Id. at 285. The Union and Long argued that Hukkanen knew or
should of known she had a claim no later than July 1983 but did not file with the EEOC until March of
1985. Id. The Union and Long asserted that she was therefore barred by the statute of limitations
from bringing an action. Id. The Eighth Circuit disagreed, however, reasoning that when a plaintiff
"prove[s] a pattern of sexual harassment that culminate[s] in [a] constructive discharge[,]" the
violations are continuing in nature and therefore the limitations period does not begin to run until the
last occurrence of the discrimination. Hukkanen, 3 F.3d at 285 (citing Gardner v. Morris, 752 F.2d
1271, 1279 (8th Cir. 1985)). In Hukkanen, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the last occurrence of
discrimination was her constructive discharge on October 29, 1984. Id. at 285. Therefore, the Eighth
Circuit found that Hukkanen's claim fell well within the statute of limitations period set forth in section
706(e)(I). Id. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(l) (1989).
14. Hukkanen, 3 F.3d at 284. The purpose of Title VII is to achieve equality in employment and
to make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination. See
Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 413-14 (1975) (stating that validation studies of
employment tests are impermissible unless shown to be significantly correlated to important elements
of work and are relevant to the job for which the candidate is being measured). A back pay award is
a form of relief which a court may award when a plaintiff shows that he or she has sustained an
economic loss as a result of an employer's discrimination. Taylor v. Phillips Indus., Inc., 593 F.2d 783,
787 (7th Cir. 1979). In the instant case, the Union and Long contended that Hukkanen was not entitled
to a back pay award because she would have been terminated for non-discriminatory reasons if she
had not resigned. Hukkanen, 3 F.3d at 285. The district court rejected this argument and the Eighth
Circuit agreed that there was no evidence that the Union intended to fire Hukkanen any time before
her resignation. Id. The Union and Long also argued that the district court's back pay award was
excessive because Hukkanen failed to mitigate her damages. Id. at 286. The Eighth Circuit again
disagreed with the Union and Long, reasoning that Hukkanen made the requisite reasonable efforts to
mitigate her damages when she secured a new job within one month of her resignation, and
persistently tried to obtain a higher paying job. id.

1070

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 71:1067

pay,' 5 pension benefits,' 6 and attorney's fees.1 7 The Union and
Hukkanen both appealed.' 8
The central issue on appeal to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
Was whether Hukkanen proved that she had been constructively discharged despite the fact that Long's actions were not taken with the intent of forcing her to resign.1 9 The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district
court's ruling, holding that in order to prove constructive discharge, Huk15. Hukkanen, 3 F.3d at 284. Front pay is a type of damages award where a court orders the
employer to pay the employee prospective pay. See MacDissi v. Valmont Indus., Inc., 856 F.2d 1054,
1060 (8th Cir. 1988) (stating that an illegally discharged employee who presumptively would have
continued working until the age of retirement, is entitled to a front pay award). To determine a front
pay award, courts presume that an illegally discharged employee would have continued working for
the employer until retirement. Id. A front pay award is a matter of equitable relief that lies within the
discretion of the district court. Id.
16. Hukkanen, 3 F.3d at 284. The Union argued that Hukkanen should not receive her pension
benefits until she retires. Id. at 286. However, the Eighth Circuit disagreed stating that "[wihen a
successful constructive discharge plaintiff is not reinstated ... the district court may award the present
value of the plaintiff's interest in [her] pension plan as of the date of settlement." Id. (citing Loeb v.
Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1021 (1st Cir. 1979)).
17. Hukkanen, 3 F.3d at 286. In Kamberos v. GTE Automatic Electronics, Inc., the court stated
that the proper method for determining a prevailing party's award of attorney's fees is to multiply the
number of hours worked with the elements set forth in the Code of Professional Responsibility as
adopted by the American Bar Association. Kamberos v. GTE Automatic Elec. Inc., 603 F.2d 598,
603-04 (7th Cir. 1979). The Code of Professional Responsibility suggests:
Factors to be considered as guides in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the
following:
(1) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and
the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly.
(2) The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular
employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer.
(3) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services.
(4) The amount involved and the results obtained.
(5) The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances.
(6) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client.
(7) The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the
services.
(8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
Id. at 604 n. 9 (citing MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrry, DR 2-106).
The Union and Long also challenged the district court's use of the attorney fee multiplier.
Hukkanen, 3 F.3d at 287. The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's award which gave
Hukkanen triple "the lodestar amount to reflect the risk of loss a lawyer faces in taking a sexual
harassment case against a high profile defendant on a contingent fee basis." Id. After the district
court decided the Hukkanen case, the United States Supreme Court handed down an opinion which
disallowed the enhancement of an attorney fee award "beyond the lodestar amount to reflect that a
party's attorneys were retained on a contingency basis." Id. (citing City of Burlington v. Dague, 112
S. Ct. 2638, 2641-44 (1992)). Therefore, regardless of the risk of loss an attorney incurs when suing a
high profile defendant on a contingent fee basis, the court may not allow enhancement of a fee award
beyond the lodestar amount. Id.
18. Hukkanen, 3 F.3d at 284. The district court declined to award Hukkanen an enhanced
monetary award to compensate her for increased income tax liability. Id. Hukkanen appealed only
this part of the decision by the district court. Id. at 287.
19. Id. Before Hukkanen, the Eighth Circuit required that an employee show that the employer
engaged in conduct with the intention of forcing the employee to resign. Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co.,
646 F.2d 1250, 1256 (8th Cir. 1981); see supra note 10 (explaining the Eighth Circuit's former standard
for constructive discharge under Title VII).

1995]

CASE COMMENT

1071

kanen did not have to show that Long's actions were taken with the intention of forcing her to resign, rather Hukkanen only had to prove that
her resignation was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of Long's
harassment.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act is federal statutory law which
bars discrimination by employers against employees based on race,
color, religion, sex, and national origin. 20 Congress adopted Title VII of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act 2 1 "to assure equality of employment opportunities and to eliminate those discriminatory practices" directed at
members of a protected class. 22 Section 703(a)(1) of the Act, which is
the substantive provision of Title VII provides in pertinent part that:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual with
respect to his [or her] compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin .... 23
Title V1I24 provides relief for individuals who are victims of unlawful employment discrimination. 25 Individuals may experience discrimi20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1989) (codifying § 703 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
21. Id. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17.
22. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973) (citing Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429 (1971)). In its enactment, Title VII required "the removal of artificial.
arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when th[ose] barriers operate invidiously to
discriminate on the basis of ...[an] impermissible classification." Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430-3 1. The
Court in Griggs dealt with the issue of standardized testing which, neutral on its face, operated
invidiously to exclude many blacks who were capable of performing the job effectively. Id. at 430.
Congress intended the language of Title VII to be read broadly in order to "eliminate the
inconvenience. unfairness. and humiliation of... discrimination." Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238
(5th Cir. 1971). In Rogers, the Fifth Circuit explained that:
Congress chose neither to enumerate specific discriminatory practices, nor to elucidate
in extenso the parameter of such nefarious activities. Rather, it pursued the path of
wisdom by being unconstrictive, knowing that constant change is the order of our day
and that the seemingly reasonable practices of the present can easily become the
injustices of the morrow.
Id.
23. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1989) (codifying § 703). Under Title VII, "the term 'employer'
means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce ... and any agent of such person." Id. §
2000e(b) (codifying § 701). An "employee" is any "individual employed by an employer." Id. §
2000e(f).
24. Id. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17.
25. Id. § 2000e-5(g)(l) (codifying § 706). It provides that:
If the court finds that the [employer] has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally
engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the court may
enjoin the [employer] from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order
such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to
reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay (payable by the employer
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nation in a number of ways, including being forced to resign on the basis of the individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 26 The
constructive discharge doctrine provides redress for the employee who is
forced to resign as a result of unlawful employment discrimination. 2 7
For purposes of analysis, it is important to distinguish a constructive
discharge from an actual discharge. Actual discharge occurs when the
employer directly terminates the employment relationship. 28 Constructive discharge is a court-created concept "that permits an
employee's resignation to be treated as a firing when certain circumstances are present." 29
The constructive discharge doctrine first appeared as a labor law
concept under the National Labor Relations Act [hereinafter NLRA], in
cases involving anti-discrimination provisions of the Act. 30 According to
...responsible for the unlawful employment practice), or any other equitable relief as
the court deems appropriate. Back pay liability shall not accrue from a date more than
two years prior to the filing of a charge with the Commission. Interim earnings or
amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the person ... discriminated against shall
operate to reduce the back pay otherwise allowable.
Id.
26. An individual may be discriminated against on the basis of a protected trait in many, if not all
phases of the employment relationship, including but not limited to: hiring, promotions, transfers, and
benefits. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111 (1985) (reasoning that defendant's
refusal to transfer workers over a particular age was age discrimination in violation of Title VII).
27. See Easter v. Jeep Corp., 750 F.2d 520, 521 (6th Cir. 1984) (applying constructive discharge
doctrine in a sexual harassment case); Goss v. Exxon Office Sys. Co., 747 F.2d 885, 887-88 (3d Cir.
1984) (applying the constructive discharge doctrine in a pregnancy discrimination case); Pena v.
Brattleboro Retreat, 702 F.2d 322, 325-26 (2d Cir. 1983) (applying the constructive discharge doctrine
in an age discrimination case).
28. Frazer v. KFC Nat'l Management Co.. 491 F. Supp. 1099, 1105 (M.D. Ga. 1980), aff'd
without opinion, 636 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1981).
29. Mark A. Kelley, Constructive Discharge: A Suggested Standard For West Virginia and Other
Jurisdictions, 93 W. VA. L. REv. 1047, 1049 (1991). Constructive discharge has been defined as:
a discharge implied by the courts. No express or actual discharge occurs; rather, the
courts examine the circumstances surrounding the employee's decision to quit or resign.
If the decision was forced on the employee, the courts will deem it a constructive
discharge and will treat the employee as if he or she has been explicitly and directly
discharged.
Id. (citing Baxter & Farrell, Constructive Discharge -When Quitting Means Getting Fired, 7
EMPLOYMENT REL. LJ. 346,347 (1981) (emphasis omitted)).
30. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1988). The NLRA prohibits an employer from discriminating against
an employee on the basis of union membership. Id. § 158(b)(2). The National Labor Relations Board
adopted the constructive discharge doctrine because it recognized that an employer might attempt to
indirectly discriminate against union members by making their working conditions so intolerable that
an employee would be forced to resign. Martin W. O'Toole, Note, Choosing a Standard for
Constructive Discharge in Title VII Litigation, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 587, 589-91 (1986). Section
158(a)(3) provides that:
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in a labor organization
National Labor Relations Act, § 8(a)(3) as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1988).
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the NLRA, the existence of a constructive discharge requires that "the
burdens imposed upon the employee must cause and be intended to
cause, a change in ... working conditions so difficult or unpleasant as to
force [the employee] to resign." 3 1 Therefore, for an employee to prevail on a claim of constructive discharge, the NLRA standard requires
proof of the employer's specific intent to force the employee to
resign .32
The First Circuit considered the NLRA's standard but developed a
different view of constructive discharge in Rosado v. Santiago.33 After
rejecting the NLRA's specific intent standard for constructive discharge,
the Rosado court set forth an objective view of the constructive discharge
doctrine.34 The Rosado court based its objective standard on the premise that, in order to show a constructive discharge, the employee need
only show that working conditions became "so difficult or unpleasant
that a reasonable person in the employee's shoes [would have felt] compelled to resign." 35
In addition to both Title VII and the NLRA recognizing the applicability of the constructive discharge doctrine, other sources of statutory
law have also recognized its applicability. 36 While all of the various
circuit courts universally recognize the appropriateness of applying the
constructive discharge doctrine in Title VII cases, there is a split in authority among the circuits over the proper standard for determining whether
an employee has been constructively discharged. 37 Some circuit courts
have applied the objective standard for constructive discharge set forth in

31. Crystal Princeton Refining Co., 222 N.L.R.B. 167, 169 (1976).
32. See J.P. Steven & Co., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 461 F.2d 490, 494 (4th Cir. 1972) (finding when an
employer deliberately makes an employee's working conditions intolerable, thereby forcing the
employee to quit, that employee has been constructively discharged in violation of § 8(a)(3) of the
NLRA); N.L.R.B. v. Tennessee Packers, Inc., 339 F.2d 203, 204 (6th Cir. 1964) (finding that employer
forced employee to quit by making working conditions intolerable).
33. 562 F.2d 114, 120 (1st Cir. 1977) (stating that the trial court must make a factual inquiry to
determine whether a public employee who had received a punitive transfer for exercising a first
amendment right had been constructively discharged).
34. Rosado v. Santiago, 562 F.2d 114 (1st Cir. 1977).
35. Id. at 119. The Rosado court compared this standard for constructive discharge to the
doctrine of avoidable consequences, which requires that an unlawfully discharged public employee
must mitigate damages by avoiding foreseeable harm to receive damages. Id. (citing McKenna v.
Commissioner of Mental Health, 199 N.E.2d 686 (Mass. 1964)).
36. See, e.g., Kelley v. TYK Refractories, 860 F.2d 1188 (3d Cir. 1988) (applying the
constructive discharge doctrine to a discrimination case brought under § 1981 of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act); Guthrie v. J.C. Penney Co., 803 F.2d 202, 207-08 (5th Cir. 1986) (stating that the ADEA
recognizes the doctrine of constructive discharge as an avenue of relief from discrimination).
37. Goss v. Exxon Office Systems Co., 747 F.2d 885, 887 (3d Cir. 1984) (describing the
difference in opinion concerning the appropriate constructive discharge standard by stating that
"while the application of the constructive discharge doctrine to Title VII cases has received . ..
universal recognition among the courts of appeals . . . there is a divergence of opinion as to the
findings necessary for such application in specific instances").
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Rosado v. Santiago,38 while other circuit courts have applied the specific
39
intent standard for constructive discharge developed under labor law.
The Fifth Circuit was the first circuit to apply the constructive discharge doctrine in a Title VII discrimination case. 4 0 In Bourque v.
Powell Electric Manufacturing Co.,41 the Fifth Circuit accepted the
Rosado court's reasoning and applied the objective standard for constructive discharge.42 The Bourque court stated that a constructive discharge exists in a Title VII case when "working conditions [are] so difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable person in the employee's shoes
[feels] compelled to resign."4 3 The Bourque court reasoned, however,
that a mere isolated instance of unlawful discrimination under Title VII
is not enough to constitute a constructive discharge. 44 Rather, the court
stated that certain "aggravating factors" must exist before it would find
38. 562 F.2d at 119. See also Derr v. Gulf Oil Corp., 796 F.2d 340, 344 (10th Cir. 1986)
(applying the objective standard for constructive discharge); Goss, 747 F.2d at 887-88 (applying the
objective rather than subjective standard for constructive discharge); Pena v. Brattleboro Retreat, 702
F.2d 322, 325-26 (2d Cir. 1983) (adopting the objective standard for constructive discharge); Held v.
Gulf Oil Co., 684 F.2d 427, 432 (6th Cir. 1982) (applying the objective standard for constructive
discharge); Noland v. Cleland, 686 F.2d 806, 812-13 (9th Cir. 1982) (adopting the objective standard
for constructive discharge in Title VII cases); Henson v. City of Dundee. 682 F.2d 897, 907 (11 th Cir.
1982) (applying the objective standard for constructive discharge set forth in Rosado v. Santiago);
Clark v. Marsh, 665 F.2d 1168, 1173-74 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (applying the objective standard for
constructive discharge in Title VII cases).
39. Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co., 646 F.2d 1250, 1256 (8th Cir. 1981); see also Muller v. United
States Steel Corp., 509 F.2d 923,929 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975) (applying the
subjective standard for constructive discharge developed under labor law). When applying the
specific intent standard for constructive discharge in a Title VII case of unlawful discrimination, the
Eighth and Tenth Circuits require "a finding that the discrimination complained of amounted to an
intentional course of conduct calculated to force the victim's resignation." Goss, 747 F.2d at 887.
40. Bourque v. Powell Elec. Mfg. Co., 617 F.2d 61,65 (5th Cir. 1980).
41. 617 F.2d 61 (5th Cir. 1980) (considering a former female employee's claim of constructive
discharge in a Title VII action for sex discrimination against her employer for failing to provide equal
pay for equal work).
42. Id. at 65. The Bourque court discussed the standard for constructive discharge the Fifth
Circuit had previously recognized in Calcote v. Texas Education Foundation, Inc., 578 F.2d 95, 97 (5th
Cir. 1978), and Young v. Southwestern Savings & Loan Association, 509 F.2d 140, 143-44 (5th Cir.
1975), which required the plaintiff to show that it was their employer's intent to make working
conditions so intolerable that the employee would be forced to resign. Bourque, 617 F.2d at 65. The
Bourque court reasoned that "[nleither in Young nor in Calcote did this Court examine the facts under
the stringent test that requires an employer's intent to rid itself of an employee. In neither case did the
Court attempt to divine the state of mind of the employer. Rather, analysis proceeded upon an
examination of the conditions imposed." Id. at 65 (citing Calcote, 578 F.2d at 97-98; Young, 509 F.2d
at 144).
43. Bourque, 617 F.2d at 65 (quoting Rosado v. Santiago, 562 F.2d 114, 119 (1st Cir. 1977)).
Before Bourque, the Fifth Circuit relied upon the subjective NLRA approach to constructive
discharge. Young, 509 F.2d at 144. In Young, the Fifth Circuit stated that:
If the employer deliberately makes an employee's working conditions so intolerable that
the employee is forced into an involuntary resignation, then the employer has
encompassed a constructive discharge and is as liable for any illegal conduct involved
therein as if it had formally discharged the aggrieved employee.
44. Bourque, 617 F.2d at 65.
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that a reasonable person in the employee's situation felt forced to
resign .45
While most circuit cobrts have followed the Bourque court's reasoning and have adopted a purely objective view of the constructive
discharge doctrine in Title VII cases, 46 a few circuit courts have required
a showing of specific intent on the part of the employer to prove the
existence of a constructive discharge. 47 For example, the Third Circuit
in Goss v. Exxon Office Systems Co.,48 applied the specific intent
49
standard for constructive discharge in a pregnancy discrimination case.
The Goss court determined that the employee had been discriminated
against on the basis of her pregnancy and that the defendant had

45. Id.
46. See supra note 38 (citing the various circuit court cases which apply the objective standard
for constructive discharge in discrimination cases).
47. Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co., 646 F.2d 1250, 1256 (8th Cir. 1981); Muller v. United States
Steel Corp., 509 F.2d 923, 929 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975). When an
employee brings a Title VII suit alleging that he or she has been constructively discharged, the
employee must, under either approach, establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). Under the disparate treatment theory
of unlawful discrimination, the employee must present circumstantial evidence of unlawful
discrimination to make out a prima facie case. Id. McDonnell Douglas involved an employer's
refusal to rehire a black employee because of his participation in illegal civil rights demonstrations.
Id. at 796. McDonnell Douglas set forth the pattern of proof under disparate treatment which required
that employee must carry the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of race discrimination by
showing that: (1) the employee is a member of a protected class; (2) that he or she applied and was
qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (3) that, despite his or her
qualifications, he or she was rejected: and (4) that, after his or her rejection, the position remained
open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons with complainant's qualifications.
Id. at 802. The Supreme Court explained in a footnote that "[t]he facts necessarily will vary in Title
VII cases, and the specification ... of the prima facie proof required ... is not necessarily applicable
in every respect to differing factual situations." Id. at 802 n. 13. Once an employee presents a prima
facie case of discrimination, the burden shifts to the employer to show a nondiscriminatory reason for
its employment decision. Id. at 802. In Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, the
Supreme Court established that the burden of persuasion remains at all times with the plaintiff while
only a burden of production shifts to the defendant in articulating a nondiscriminatory reason for the
employment decision. 450 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1281). If an employer articulates a nondiscriminatory
reason for its employment decision, then the employee must be "afforded a fair opportunity to show"
that the purported nondiscriminatory reason was merely a pretext for discrimination. McDonnell
Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804. If the employee establishes that the employer's stated reason was merely
pretext, the employer may be liable for discrimination under Title VII. Id. at 807. The determination
of whether the employer's stated reason is pretextual, is one of fact rather than one of law. See St.
Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2749 (1993) (stating that when the employer's proffered
reasons for its employment decision are proven false, courts may "infer the ultimate fact of . . .
discrimination" but are not compelled to do so as a matter of law). To make out a prima facie case of
discrimination where the act of discrimination is the employee's discharge, the employee must show
that 1) he or she is a member of a protected class, 2) was qualified for the position he or she was
discharged from, 3) that he or she was replaced by a person outside of a protected class, and 4) that
the discharge occurred in circumstances which give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.
Pena v. Brattleboro Retreat, 702 F.2d 322, 324 (2d Cir. 1983). In Pena, the plaintiff brought an age
discrimination case alleging that she had been constructively discharged from her job as an
administrator of a psychiatric nursing home facility when she was replaced by a younger woman. Id.
48. 747 F.2d 885, 888 (3d Cir. 1984).
49. Goss v. Exxon Office Systems Co., 747 F.2d 885, 888 (3d Cir. 1984).
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intentionally made the employee's working conditions so intolerable
that she had been constructively discharged.50
Moreover, in Johnson v. Bunny Bread Cfb.,5 1 the Eighth Circuit set
forth its standard for constructive discharge 52 which required both
subjective and objective elements to prove the existence of a constructive
discharge. 5 3 Under the Bunny Bread standard, an employer
constructively discharged an employee if "[the] employer deliberately
render[ed] the employee's working conditions intolerable and thus
force[d] [the employee] to quit."5 4 To prove that an employer
deliberately altered working conditions to the detriment of the employee,
the employee must show that "the employer's actions [were] taken with
the intention of forcing the employee to quit." 5 5 An employee must
also demonstrate that "a reasonable person [in the employee's situation]
would find conditions intolerable." 5 6 Thus, although most circuits
apply either the objective or the subjective standard for constructive
discharge, 5 7 the Eighth Circuit required the employee to show elements
58
of both standards to prove the existence of a constructive discharge.
The constructive discharge doctrine universally applies to all forms
of discrimination, including sexual harassment claims 5 9 under Title
50. Id.
51. 646 F.2d 1250 (8th Cir. 1981).
52. Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co., 646 F.2d 1250, 1256 (8th Cir. 1981). Black employees brought
an action claiming racial discrimination in their employment. Id. at 1252-53. Plaintiffs made out a
prima facie case for discrimination in that plaintiffs were members of a protected class, capable of
performing the job, and discharged from the job. Id. at 1253. Because the employer presented
admissible evidence that the employer fired one plaintiff for insubordination, the plaintiffs' prima
facie case was rebutted and therefore insufficient evidence existed to establish a claim. Id. at 1254.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, and in doing so, outlined the standard for constructive
discharge. Id.
53. Id. at 1256.
54. Id. (citing Slotkin v. Human Dev. Corp., 454 F. Supp. 250, 255 (E.D. Mo. 1978)). See
Thompson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 552 F.2d 220, 223 (8th Cir. 1977) (stating that to constitute a
constructive discharge, the employee must show that it was the employer's intent to force the
employee to resign).
55. Bunny Bread Co., 646 F.2d at 1256.
56. Id.
57. See supra note 38 and 39 (discussing cases which apply either the objective and subjective
tests).
58. Bunny Bread Co., 646 F.2d at 1256. The Eighth Circuit required that the employee may not
be unreasonably sensitive to his [or her] working environment. Id. Even though the court includes an
element of reasonableness, it is not the central inquiry to the Eighth Circuit determining whether an
employee was constructively discharged. Id.
59. Sexual harassment is defined as "[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors,
and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature" in the workplace. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)
(1994). Subsections (1), (2), and (3), provide that unwelcome sexual conduct constitutes sexual
harassment when:
(I) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition
of an individual's employment.
(2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for
employment decisions affecting such individual, or
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VII.60 Sexual harassment is not explicitly prohibited by Title VII,
however the Supreme Court has opined that sexual harassment nevertheless violates the Act.61 Because Title VII does not explicitly prohibit discrimination in the form of harassment, it took almost ten years from the
time Congress enacted Title VII for the lower courts to recognize harass62
ment as a form of discrimination under the Act.
By 1976, lower courts began to recognize sexual harassment as a
form of sex discrimination when the harassment affected an employee's
economic benefits. 6 3 In Barnes v. Costle, 64 the D.C. Circuit produced
one of the most explicit treatments of sexual harassment as a form of sex
discrimination when it stated that:
[b]ut for her womanhood . . . her participation in sexual
activity would never have been solicited. To say, then, that she
was victimized in her employment simply because she declined
the invitation is to ignore the asserted fact that she was invited
only because she was a woman subordinate to the inviter in the
hierarchy of agency personnel. Put another way, she became
the target of her superior's sexual desires because she was a
woman, and was asked to bow to his demands as the price for
holding her job. The circumstances imparting high visibility to

(3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an
individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working
environment.
Id.
Courts recognize two types of sexual harassment claims under Title VII: quid pro quo and
hostile environment. Jones v. Wesco Inv., Inc., 846 F.2d 1154, 1156 (8th Cir. 1988). Quid pro quo
sexual harassment "occurs when submission to sexual conduct is made a condition of concrete
employment benefits." Id. (citing Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010. 1013 (8th Cir. 1988) (quoting
St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 833 F.2d at 1413)). Hostile environment sexual harassment is defined
as "conduct [which] has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work
performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment." Burns v.
McGregor Elec. Indus., Inc., 955 F.2d 559, 564-65 (8th Cir. 1992) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 l(a)(3)
(1988)). It is important to note however, that "[n]ot all harassment rises to the level of an actionable
claim[,] [r]ather, the conduct must be so severe or pervasive that it creates an abusive working
environment." Id. at 564 (citing Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57. 67 (1986)).
60. Henson, 682 F.2d at 904.
61. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66 (stating that sexual harassment constitutes a form of sex
discrimination and is therefore actionable under Title VII).
62. See Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 239-40 (5th Cir. 1971) (stating that creating a harassing
work environment was a discriminatory employment practice proscribed by Title VII). The Rogers
court reasoned that because the employee's working environment is important and may fall victim to
"nuances and subtleties of discriminatory employment practice," the employee's work environment is
no longer limited to wages and hours, and is entitled to Title VII protection. Id. at 238.
63. Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 587 F.2d 1240
(D.C. Cir. 1978). In Williams. the court ruled that sex discrimination exists when a male supervisor
discharges a female employee as retaliation after the female employee refuses the supervisor's sexual
advances. Id. at 657.
64. 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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the role of gender in the affair is that no male employee was
susceptible to such an approach by appellant's supervisor.
Thus gender cannot be eliminated from the formulation which
appellant advocates, and that formulation advances a prima
facie case of sex discrimination within the perview of Title
VII.65

In 1986, the Supreme Court in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson 66
ruled for the first time that a plaintiff claiming hostile environment sexual harassment stated a claim under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act. 67 In concluding that sexual harassment was actionable under Title
VII as sex discrimination, the Supreme Court stated that "Title VII affords employees the right to work in an environment free from discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult." 68 However, for sexual harass-

ment to be actionable, it must be "sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter
the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive working environment." 69
In Henson v. City of Dundee,70 the Eleventh Circuit applied the constructive discharge doctrine in a sexual harassment case 71 and reasoned
that "[w]hen 'an employee involuntarily resigns in order to escape intolerable and illegal employment requirements' to which he or she is subjected to because of ... sex, the employer has committed a constructive
discharge in violation of Title VII."72

Even though every circuit and the Supreme Court agree that sexual
harassment is sex discrimination in violation of Title VII, the circuit
courts continue to be divided over the appropriate standard for determining whether an individual has been constructively discharged as a re-

65. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983,990 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
66. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
67. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65-66 (1986).
68. Jd. at 65.
69. Id. at 67.
70. 682 F.2d 897 (11 th Cir. 1982).
71. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897,902 (1 th Cir. 1982). In Henson, the court stated
that "[slexual harassment which creates a hostile or offensive environment for members of one sex is
every bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual equality at the workplace that racial harassment is to racial
equality." Id. Sexual conduct "directed at women raises an inference that the harassment is based on
the woman's sex." Bums v. McGregor Elec. Indus., Inc., 955 F.2d 559, 564 (8th Cir. 1992). To make
out a prima facie case of discrimination resulting from sexual harassment, the Henson court required
the employee to show that she is a member of a protected class; that she was subject to unwelcome
sexual harassment; that the harassment was based on her sex; that the harassment affected her
employment; and that the employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take
action. Henson, 682 F.2d at 907-08.
72. Henson, 682 F.2d at 907. In Henson, the court did not find that the plaintiff had been
constructively discharged because the court believed her resignation was voluntary and for reasons
other than sexual harassment. Id. (citing Young v. Southwestern Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 140.
144 (5th Cir. 1975)).
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suit of that harassment. 73 The majority of circuits, however, have adopted an objective standard for constructive discharge which requires a
showing that a reasonable person in the employee's position would feel
74
forced to resign.
III. ANALYSIS
The district court, in Hukkanen v. International Union of Operating
Engineers,7 5 relied on the constructive discharge standard that the Eighth
Circuit set forth in Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co.,76 to determine whether
the plaintiff, Nancy J. Hukkanen, had been constructively discharged
from her position with the Union. 77 Misapplying the Bunny Bread
standard, the district court found sufficient evidence that Long's
continual and unwelcome harassment of Hukkanen made her working
conditions intolerable, that such intolerable working conditions would
have had the same effect on a reasonable person in Hukkanen's
situation, and as a result, she had been constructively discharged. 7 8 The
district court further found that the cumulative effect of Long's
continual sexual harassment of Hukkanen created intolerable working
conditions, and that a reasonable person in Hukkanen's situation would
be forced to resign as a result of those working conditions. 7 9
The district court did not, however, require Hukkanen to show that
Long's actions were taken with the intention of forcing her to resign as
required by Bunny Bread.8 0 Rather, the court only required Hukkanen
to show that a reasonable person in her position would have been forced
to resign. 8 1
73. See supra notes 37 and 39 (citing the various circuit court cases which apply either the
objective or the subjective standard for constructive discharge in discrimination cases).
74. See supra note 37.
75. 3 F.3d 281 (8th Cir. 1993).
76. 646 F.2d 1250 (8th Cir. 1981). The Bunny Bread standard requires that an employer must
render an employee's working conditions intolerable; an employer's actions must have been taken
with the intention of forcing the employee to quit; and a reasonable person in employee's situation
must find working conditions intolerable. Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co.. 646 F.2d 1250, 1256 (8th Cir.
1981). In Bunny Bread, the plaintiffs were unable to show that the employer's actions were taken
with the intention of forcing the employees to quit because all the employees were treated the same
way. Id.
77. Hukkanen v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, 3 F.3d 281, 284 (8th Cir. 1993).
78. Id. at 285. The district court found that Long subjected Hukkanen to unwelcome harassment
over a two-year period that consisted of Long propositioning Hukkanen to have sex with him,
attempting "to engage her in offensive conversations about sex, touch[ingj her breasts, and pawfing]
between her legs." Id. On one occasion in his office. Long brandished a gun and threatened to rape
Hukkanen. Id.
79. Id. at 285.
80. Id.
81. See id. The Eighth Circuit did not explicitly state this, however, it may be inferred from the
court's discussion equating the intent requirement with the reasonable person requirement. Id. The
court stated that "[wihether a court applies Bunny Bread's language about the employer intending to
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The Eighth Circuit reviewed the standard for constructive discharge
it set forth in Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co., and noted that it had
required both that a reasonable person in the employee's situation must
find conditions intolerable and feel forced to resign, and that the
"employers actions must have been taken with the intention of forcing
the employee to quit." 82 Because the district court did not require Hukkanen to show Long's intent, the Eighth Circuit stated that the district
court had incorrectly applied the constructive discharge standard as set
forth in Johnson v. Bunny Bread C0.83
The Union alleged that Hukkanen had not proven this element of
constructive discharge. 8 4 The Union argued that Hukkanen had not
proven that she been constructively discharged because Long's intent in
sexually harassing Hukkanen was for his own sexual gratification and
not to force her to quit. 85
In rejecting the Union's argument, the Eighth Circuit looked to the
other circuits and their assessment of the standard for constructive
discharge. 86 The court first examined Derr v. Gulf Oil Corp.,87 where the
Tenth Circuit clarified its constructive discharge standard in the Title VII
context when it stated that "constructive discharge cases turn simply on
whether the employer, by its illegal discriminatory acts, has made
working conditions so difficult that a reasonable person in the

force the employee to quit or its language about a reasonable employee finding conditions intolerable,
the same evidence is involved and the constructive discharge finding is the same." Id.
82. Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co., 646 F.2d 1250, 1256 (8th Cir. 1981). The Eighth Circuit
affirmed on the issue of constructive discharge but remanded the case to determine attorney's fees.
Hukkanen v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, 3 F.3d 281. 287 (8th Cir. 1993). The district
court had applied an attorney fee multiplier, tripling the lodestar amount of attorney's fees to
compensate for the increased risk involved in a discrimination claim against a "high profile
defendant." Id. Since the district court's award, the United States Supreme Court held that the
"federal fee shifting statutes do not allow enhancement of a fee award beyond the lodestar amount to
reflect that a party's attorneys were retained on a contingency basis." Id. (citing City of Burlington v.
Dague, 112 S. Ct. 2638, 2641-44 (1992)).
83. 646 F.2d 1250 (8th Cir. 1981). The Bunny Bread standard explicitly required the employee to
show the employer's actions were taken with the intent of forcing the employee to resign. Id. at 1256.
By not requiring Hukkanen to show Long's actions were taken with the intention of forcing her to
resign, the district court ultimately and perhaps unknowingly applied the majority view of the
constructive discharge doctrine which requires only a showing that a reasonable person in the
employee's situation felt forced to resign. Accord Derr v. Gulf Oil Corp., 796 F.2d 340,344 (10th Cir.
1986); Goss v. Exxon Office Systems Co., 747 F.2d 885, 887-88 (3d Cir. 1984); Pena v. Brattleboro
Retreat, 702 F.2d 322, 325-26 (2d Cir. 1983); Held v. Gulf Oil Co., 684 F.2d 427,432 (6th Cir. 1982);
Noland v. Cleland, 686 F.2d 806, 812-13 (9th Cir 1982); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 907
(11 th Cir. 1982); Clark v. Marsh, 655 F.2d 1168, 1173-74 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
84. Hukkanen, 3 F.3d at 284.
85. Id. In fact, Long even went so far as to say that he wanted her to stay on the job so he could
continue to sexually harass her. Id.
86. Hukkanen, 3 F.3d at 284 (citing Derr, 796 F.2d at 344; Held, 684 F.2d at 432; and Clark, 665
F.2d at 1173).
87. 796 F.2d 340 (10th Cir. 1986).
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employee's position would feel compelled to resign." 88 The Tenth
Circuit struggled with the problems the plaintiff faces in proving that the
employer's explicit subjective intent in discriminating was to force the
plaintiff to quit. 89 In simplifying the standard, the Tenth Circuit directed
the focus away from the employer's subjective intent to an objective
standard, where an employee shows a constructive discharge exists when
a reasonable person in the employee's situation finds working
conditions so intolerable that the employee feels forced to resign.90
The Eighth Circuit looked next to Held v. Gulf Oil Co., 9 1 where the
Sixth Circuit stated that the issue of "constructive discharge ... depends
upon the facts of each case and requires an inquiry into the intent of the
employer and the reasonably foreseeable impact of the employer's
conduct upon the employee." 92 The court further noted that "a man is
held to intend the foreseeable consequences of his conduct." 93 Even
though the Sixth Circuit recognized that the intent of the employer is a
consideration for determining whether an employee has been
constructively discharged, proving it may be accomplished by showing
the employer's actions would ultimately result in the employee's resignation, regardless of intent.94
The Eighth Circuit, in Hukkanen, applied the language and reasoning proffered by the Sixth and Tenth Circuits to modify the Eighth Circuit's constructive discharge standard. 95 The court appeared to adopt
the language from the Sixth Circuit regarding a discharge being a "reasonably foreseeable consequence of the employer's actions." 96 Using
the Sixth Circuit's language, the Eighth Circuit reasoned that the Bunny
Bread standard does not require the employee prove his or her employer
"consciously meant to force [the employee] to quit" but rather the
employee must prove only that his or her resignation was "a reasonably
foreseeable consequence" of the employer's actions. 97 The court stated
that where "an employer denies a conscious effort to force an employee

88. Derr v. Gulf Oil Corp., 796 F.2d 340,344 (10th Cir. 1986).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. 684 F.2d 427.432 (6th Cir. 1986).
92. Held v. Gulf Oil Co., 684 F.2d 427.432 (6th Cir. 1986) (citing Jacobs v. Martin Sweets Co.,
550 F.2d 364 (6th Cir. 1977)).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Hukkanen v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, 3 F.3d 281, 284 (8th Cir. 1993).
96. Held,684 F.2d at 432.
97. Hukkanen, 3 F.3d at 284-85 (emphasis added). The court applied the facts in the instant case
concerning Long's "sexual corruption" of Hukkanen to find that Hukkanen's resignation was a
reasonably foreseeable consequence of Long's conduct. Id.
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to resign, . . . the employer must necessarily be held to intend the
98
reasonably foreseeable consequences of its actions."
In characterizing its standard, the Eighth Circuit recognized the
resulting absurdity if the court required an employee prove that the employer's conduct was the result of an intent to force the employee to
resign.99 Those employees whom their employers discriminated against
because they intended for them to resign could prove constructive discharge, where an employee who suffered discrimination without the underlying intent would not be able to prove the existence of a constructive
discharge.100
Under this analysis, even though the Eighth Circuit did not expressly adopt the objective standard for constructive discharge, the result was
effectively and functionally equivalent. Applying the language from
Held v. Gulf Oil Co., the Eighth Circuit no longer requires the plaintiff to
show an employer's actual intent when that employer denies a conscious
intent to force the employee to resign.lOi By applying the language in
Held, the Hukkanen court seems to abandon Bunny Bread's specific
intent requirement because presumably every defendant employer would
deny intent in forcing the employee to resign. Moreover, the Eighth
Circuit went on to state that an employee satisfies the intent requirement
of Bunny Bread when the employee can show that their resignation was a
reasonably foreseeable consequence of the employer's actions. 10 2 By
making this showing, the employee is not required to show actual intent
at all. In conclusion, it is clear that the Eighth Circuit modified its
standard for constructive discharge in Hukkanen to require something
less than required under Bunny Bread, however, it is unclear whether this
modification undermines the Bunny Bread standard all together.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
The Eighth Circuit's decision in Hukkanen v. International Union
of Operating Engineers,10 3 will undoubtedly have an impact on future
constructive discharge cases in the Eighth Circuit.10 4 The Eighth
Circuit's modified standard for constructive discharge creates a
98. Id. at 284.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 284-85.
101. Id. at 284. It seems reasonable that every employer would deny any intent in forcing the
employee to resign, therefore it appears that an employee would not be required to fulfill an intent
requirement whether it is specific intent or inferred intent because quitting is a reasonably foreseeable
consequence of an employer's unlawful discrimination.
102. Hukkanen v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, 3 F.3d 281, 284 (8th Cir. 1993).
103. 3 F.3d 281 (8th Cir. 1993).
104. Hukkanen v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, 3 F.3d 281 (8th Cir. 1993).
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smoother path for the plaintiff-employee to travel in proving the
existence of a constructive discharge. Even though the Eighth Circuit
did not explicitly adopt the objective standard for constructive discharge,
the effect of requiring that an employee's resignation be a reasonably
foreseeable consequence of an employer's actions, and that the
employer must be held to intend the reasonably foreseeable
consequences of its actions, is functionally equivalent. While it appears
that this modified constructive discharge standard follows the majority
view of constructive discharge, it is unclear how far the court's decision
in Hukkanen will reach.
Examining the Hukkanen decision closely however, what is clear
from the Eighth Circuit's modification of its constructive discharge standard, is that it categorically places the employee in a better position to
prove a constructive discharge, regardless of whether the Hukkanen court
meant that a "reasonably foreseeable consequence" required some
showing of intent, or if it meant to eliminate the intent requirement
altogether. In either situation, the employee shoulders a lighter burden
in proving the elements of a constructive discharge in the Eighth
Circuit.10 5
The implication of the Eighth Circuit's decision in Hukkanen v.
International Union of Operating Engineers, and its view of employment
law may be better understood in light of other recent Eighth Circuit
decisions in the area of employment discrimination. 106 In Hukkanen, it
is clear that the Eighth Circuit allowed greater protection for the
employee and a better opportunity to gain relief by proving a
constructive discharge as a result of an unlawful employment practice.
The court's employee-friendly indications in Hukkanen however, did
not necessarily extend to other recent Eighth Circuit employment law
cases. In Wilde v. County of Kandiyohi,107 the Eighth Circuit ruled that it
would continue to follow the common law or hybrid test, 10 8 rather than
105. Regardless of a requirement to show any amount of intent on the part of the employer, if an
employee does not adequately demonstrate that a reasonable person in the same or similar
circumstances would have felt forced to resign, the plaintiff would automatically lose on the issue of
constructive discharge.
106. See. e.g., Wilde v. County of Kandiyohi, 15 F.3d 103, 105 (8th Cir. 1994) (stating that the
correct test for determining whether an individual is an employee or an independent contractor is the
common law or hybrid test and not the economic realities test); Kopp v. Samaritan Health Sys., Inc., 13
F.3d 264, 269 (8th Cir. 1993) (stating that conduct not explicitly sexual in nature may be offensive
enough to establish hostile environment sexual harassment under Title VII).
107. 15 F.3d 103 (8th Cir. 1994).
108. Wilde, 15 F.3d at 105-06. Under the common law or hybrid test, a court examines the
totality of the working relationship in light of the factors listed in the Restatement (Second) of Agency.
Id. at 106. Under the Restatement (Second) of Agency, those factors include:
[Tihe hiring party's right to control the manner and means by which the product is
accomplished[;] . .. the skills required [for the job]; the source of the instrumentalities
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adopt the minority view, the economic realities test, 10 9 in determining
whether an individual was an "employee" or an "independent
contractor" for purposes of employer liability under Title VII.110 In
making its decision, the Eighth Circuit reasoned that, in application, the
economic realities test would result in Title VII coverage for "some
common law independent contractors because they are vulnerable to discrimination arising in the course of their work."Ill The court further
reasoned that the economic realities test is broader than the common law
or hybrid test and is therefore an inapplicable test because it distorts the
underlying purpose of Title VII.112 In Wilde, the Eighth Circuit refused
to adopt a more plaintiff-friendly position by redefining its test for
determining whether an individual is an "employee" or an "independent contractor" for Title VII purposes. 13
In Kopp v. Samaritan Health System, Inc.,1 14 the Eighth Circuit
maintained its employee-friendly position in an employment discrimination case concerning the type of predicate acts necessary to support a
claim for hostile environment sexual harassment. 115 The Kopp court concluded that the predicate acts necessary to sustain a claim of discrimination under Title VII need not be explicitly sexual in nature. 1l 6 The court
reasoned that even though defendant Alaghdadi's conduct toward Kopp
was not explicitly sexual in nature, examination of the facts provided
sufficient proof that his conduct was offensive and was therefore
actionable under Title VII as sex discrimination."17
and tools; the location of the work; the duration of the relationship between the partieswhether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the hired party; the
extent of the hired party's discretion over . . . hiring and paying assistants; whether the
work is part of the regular business of the hiring party; whether the hiring party is in
business; the provision of employee benefits: and the tax treatment of the hired party.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (1958).
109. Wilde, 15 F.3d at 105. The expansive economic realities test consists of looking at the
economic realities "underlying the work relationship to decide whether the worker is likely to be
susceptible to the discriminatory practices Title VII was designed to eliminate." Id.
110. Id. The plaintiff in Wilde owned a small business that rented executive office space and
provided secretarial services. Id. at 104. The defendant in Wilde, was an executive director for the
County who rented office space and secretarial services from the plaintiff. Id. The plaintiff brought
suit against the defendant for sexual harassment in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
Id.
Ill. Id.at 105-06.
112. Id. at 106.
113. Id.
114. 13 F.3d 264 (8th Cir. 1993).
115. Kopp v. Samaritan Health Sys., Inc.. 13 F.3d 264,269 (8th Cir. 1993).
116. Id. The plaintiff, a cardiology technician, brought suit against defendants, Dr. Saadi
Albaghdadi and Samaritan Health Systems for hostile environment sexual harassment in violation of
Title VII. Id. at 265-66. Defendant Albaghadi subjected the plaintiff to harassment by shouting at her;
throwing his stethoscope at her; referring to one of her co-workers as "that stupid bitch[;]" grabbing
her with both hands by the lapels of her scrub jacket, along with her bra straps and her skin; and
shaking her and shoving her backward. Id. at 266.
117. Id. at 269-70.
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In light of the recent Eighth Circuit cases, it is not exactly clear what
path the Eighth Circuit is taking in the area of employment discrimination. What is clear, however, is that the Eighth Circuit in Hukkanen v. International Union of Operating Engineers, created a more
plaintiff-friendly environment in the area of employment discrimination
when addressing the issue of constructive discharge.
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